# HushSpec documentation Declare what an agent may do. Enforce it before a side effect. Keep evidence that another implementation can read and verify. HushSpec v1 is a portable policy and evidence specification with a CLI and reference SDKs for Rust, TypeScript, Python and Go. Start with a small tested boundary, then expand its coverage deliberately. ## Write a policy Follow the [quickstart](guides/getting-started.md), download the policy and tests, and see allow, deny and confirmation-required decisions. [All twelve rule blocks](rules-reference.md) cover paths, tools, egress, content, shell, desktop, browser and code-execution actions. ## Integrate an agent Use a [runtime guard](guides/runtime-integration.md) immediately before dispatch. The [MCP guide](guides/integrations/mcp.md) explains trusted mapping and the difference between checking a tool name and controlling its effects. Pick a [language SDK](reference/sdk-api.md) for exact APIs and return conventions. ## Inspect evidence Understand [canonical policy identity](canonical-spec.md), [decision receipts](receipt-spec.md), [signing](signing-spec.md), [logs](log-spec.md), and [bundles](bundle-spec.md). Authenticity, continuity, completeness, and runtime truth are separate claims. ## Implement the specification Read the [normative library](reference/specifications.md), then run a [conformance corpus](reference/conformance.md) against a specific implementation. Use [schemas](reference/json-schema.md) and [registries](reference/registries.md) as machine-readable companions, not substitutes for evaluation semantics. ## What v1 guarantees The v1 portable contract is stable under the [versioning policy](reference/versioning.md). Receipt/signature wire version 0.2 and log/bundle version 0.1 remain current. Strict evidence profiles, external-engine execution packets, and the [trusted-invocation pilot](reference/trusted-invocation.md) remain experimental. ## Where the boundary ends HushSpec evaluates descriptions of actions. The host owns authentication, dispatch, filesystem/network containment, counters and evidence delivery. A policy file alone is not a sandbox; a signed receipt is not certification. The [security model](security-spec.md) makes those assumptions explicit.